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Congress has enacted legislation delineating the rights of child
victims and witnesses during formal trials. In limiting its protections to
this context, however, Congress ignores the reality that much of the child
testimony upon which the legal system relies takes place outside of court
during the pre-trial stages of an investigation. Further, Congress has
failed to consider the growing numbers of children who are diagnosed
with developmental disabilities and the issues that arise when these
children are victims or witnesses of crime.
The federal approach to these issues currently consists of a
mishmash of standards that vary from circuit to circuit. This Comment
argues that, to reduce this unpredictability and inconsistency, Congress
should adopt a clear federal standard to evaluate the sufficiency of child
testimony to establish probable cause for search and arrest warrants.
Such a standard would also balance the vulnerability of child victims,
including those with developmental disabilities, against the constitutional
protections afforded to criminal defendants. The proposed legislation
consists of three major elements: (1) a flexible factor test to determine
the sufficiency of the child's testimony; (2) a provision eliminating
corroboration requirements; and (3) an exception from the rule against
* J.D. Candidate, Penn State University, The Dickinson School of Law, 2014;
B.A., University of Virginia, 2011. I would like to thank my family and friends for their
constant support and encouragement throughout my academic career, especially my
fiancd Mike Averbach, 'Nho patiently listens to complaints and helps to celebrate
successes. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the Penn State Law Review for
making my experience these past two years both enriching and enjoyable. Lastly, I am
grateful for my experience as an intern at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western
District of Pennsylvania during the summer of 2012, which served as the inspiration for
this Comment.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
hearsay. Justice is not served by discounting the testimony of victims
merely due to youth or disability, and a concise federal standard would
ensure that the federal system adequately serves these vulnerable victims.
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Imagine a six-year-old child with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder ("ADHD").' He struggles to sit still for longer than a few
seconds; he is easily distracted; he has a hard time listening when either
adults or other children address him; he struggles to follow instructions;
and he talks nonstop, frequently blurting out inappropriate comments.
This near-constant state of distraction causes him to miss and forget
details.2
Imagine that because of his ADHD, he is unable to focus in a
normal classroom setting, so he receives special education.3 One day at
school, the boy tells his teacher that his middle-aged neighbor touches
the boy's private parts, takes pictures of the boy when he is not wearing
any clothes, and uses a computer to show the boy pictures of other boys
without any clothes. The teacher then reports this to the authorities,
which results in a forensic interview.4
Following the forensic interview, a police officer completes an
affidavit 5 of probable cause,6 including details of the boy's statements at
the forensic interview, and a magistrate grants a search warrant 7 for the
neighbor's house. Agents find files containing child pornography on the
1. See Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), NAT'L INST. MENTAL
HEALTH, http://I1.usa.gov/lb6YOOF (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (describing symptoms of
ADHD, including frequent distraction, inattention to details, forgetfulness, boredom with
tasks after only a few minutes, difficulty focusing, impulsivity, and fidgeting).
2. See id.
3. See Special Education, NAT'L DISSEMINATION CENTER FOR CHILD. WITH
DISABILITIES, http://bit.ly/TV4ffk (last updated Mar. 2013) ("Special education is
instruction that is specially designed to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability.
... [It] can consist oil] an individualized curriculum that is different from that of same-
age, nondisabled peers.").
4. See Lindsay E. Cronch et al., Forensic Interviewing in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases: Current Techniques and Future Directions, 11 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV.
195, 196 (2006) (defining a forensic interview in the context of a child sexual abuse case
as an interview conducted by law enforcement officers, child protective services
personnel, or specialized interviewers, often with the participation of medical and mental
health professionals, "to elicit as complete and accurate a report from the alleged child or
adolescent victim as possible in order to determine whether the child or adolescent has
been abused").
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 66-67 (9th ed. 2009). An "affidavit" is "[a]
voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an
officer authorized to administer oaths." Id. A "search-warrant affidavit" is "[ain
affidavit, usu[ally] by a police officer or other law-enforcement agent, that sets forth facts
and circumstances supporting the existence of probable cause and asks the judge to issue
a search warrant." Id.
6. Id. at 1321 (defining "probable cause" as "[a] reasonable ground to suspect that a
person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific items
connected with a crime"); see also infra Part II.B.
7. Id. at 1470 (defining "search warrant" as "[a] judge's written order authorizing a
law-enforcement officer to conduct a search of a specified place and to seize evidence").
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neighbor's computer. A federal grand jury returns an indictment against
the neighbor, charging him with possession with intent to view child
pornography.
Further imagine that, as trial approaches, the neighbor's defense
counsel files a motion to suppress 8 the child pornography files found on
the neighbor's computer. Counsel argues that the child's age and ADHD
render his testimony inherently unreliable, and that probable cause for a
valid search was never established. The defense prevails on this
argument, and all evidence found on the neighbor's computer during the
search must be excluded, as unreliable testimony cannot provide an
adequate basis for probable cause. 9 Because no valuable evidence
remains, the charges against the neighbor are dismissed, and he walks
free.'"
Most would agree that this hypothetical result is disturbing, and that
a child should not be considered inherently unreliable merely because he
is young and has a developmental disability. But without a consistent
federal standard, such determinations of reliability remain largely within
a judge's individual discretion, resulting in a lack of clarity and
predictability in federal courts across the country.1 Without a clear,
national standard, otherwise valid evidence may be withheld from trials,
as illustrated by the hypothetical scenario above. As is, child and
developmentally disabled victims of sexual assault "tend to underreport
these events to law enforcement."' 2 Exclusion of such testimony may
have the practical result of further depriving this class of particularly
vulnerable victims from the protection of federal statutes criminalizing
sex acts committed against children.'
3
8. Id. at 1110 (defining "motion to suppress" as "[a] request that the court prohibit
the introduction of illegally obtained evidence at a criminal trial").
9. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 582 (1971) (stating that the
inquiry in determining probable cause is "always ... whether the informant's present
information is truthful or reliable").
10. See Government's Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence at 1-
4, United States v. Kofalt, No. 11-155 (W.D. Pa. July 17, 2012) (describing similar facts
to the hypothetical described above).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 624 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that
the uncorroborated hearsay testimony of a three-year-old boy is insufficient to establish
probable cause). But see Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1990)
(reaching the opposite result of Shaw upon similar facts).
12. DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUALLY ASSAULTED
CHILDREN: NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2008), available at
http://l.usa.gov/UL4sTW.
13. See, e.g., Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985)
("To discount such testimony... would only serve to discourage children and parents




Judges and lawmakers face a delicate task in striking a balance
between the rights of these vulnerable victims and the constitutional
protections guaranteed to accused criminals. 14 On the one hand, the
United States' justice system should, within reason, grant child and
developmentally disabled victims leniency in meeting legal standards
such as probable cause due to their special vulnerabilities and
circumstances.' 5 On the other hand, the Constitution exists to ensure that
false, malicious, or unreliable accusations do not result in deprivations of
liberty without due process of law. 16
Most federal attempts to strike this balance have dealt with
testimony at the trial stage 17 without much focus on the need for a
consistent, clear standard during pre-trial investigations. This Comment
explores and synthesizes the existing body of law in order to develop
proposed federal legislation that elucidates a clear, consistent standard
for the use of child and developmentally disabled victims' testimony
during pre-trial investigations to establish probable cause for search and
arrest warrants. This Comment argues that such a standard is necessary
to adequately and consistently balance the particular vulnerabilities of
child victims, including those with developmental disabilities, against the
constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants.' 8
Part II will survey federal statutes and caselaw addressing probable
cause and child testimony to establish a background for these issues.
Part III will analyze the aforementioned statutes and caselaw by
highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each in order to determine
which factors would be most useful in a workable federal standard.
Ultimately, this Comment will propose federal legislation that provides a
comprehensive, consistent standard to guide judges through the process
of determining the validity of search and arrest warrants established by
the testimony of child victims, including those with developmental
disabilities.
14. See Jennifer J. Stearman, An Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
to Protect the Rights of Crime Victims: Exploring the Effectiveness of State Efforts, 30 U.
BALT. L.F. 43, 61 (1999) ("Balancing the rights of victims with the rights of defendants
has proved to be a challenge to our system of criminal justice and has stirred much
debate.").
15. See Robert G. Marks, Note, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the
Children?: The Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute,
32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 208 (1995) ("A moral and just society should take
extraordinary measures to protect its children from the horror of child sexual abuse.").
16. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
302 (1994) ("[The] Due Process Clause operates to protect the individual against the
abuse of governmental power, by guaranteeing that no criminal prosecution shall be
initiated except on a finding of probable cause.").
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (codifying standards and protections
for federal in-court testimony of child victims and witnesses).
18. See infra note 209.
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II. PROBABLE CAUSE: A "FAIR PROBABILITY" OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
A. Relevant Terminology and Scope of Comment
This Comment will focus primarily on issues surrounding the
testimony of children during the pre-trial stages of an investigation, and
how to best resolve these issues into a workable, consistent federal
standard. Although existing federal authority defines "child" as "a
person who is under the age of 18,''19 this Comment concerns very young
children whose reliability is likely to be questioned. As such, the author
intends for any use of the term "child" to refer to a young person
between the ages of approximately three and eight years old. As will
later be discussed, however, bright-line age cutoffs are inappropriate in
this context, 20 so the statements of a two-year-old child or nine-year-old
child, for example, would not definitively be excluded from inquiry
under this Comment's proposed test.
This Comment will also address a secondary related topic: the
testimony of children with developmental disabilities. Unfortunately,
there is a dearth of federal law, either case or statutory, directly
addressing the issue of developmentally disabled child victims and
witnesses. As a result, law dealing with the testimony of young children
will have to suffice as background. The term "developmental disability"
as used in this Comment encompasses a broad range of disorders that
may impair a child's normal functioning, behavior, and cognitive
abilities. Such disorders include, but are not limited to, ADHD,2' some
autism spectrum disorders,22 post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"),
23
and anxiety disorders.24
The author intends the proposed test to cover only the testimony of
developmentally disabled children who possess some communicative
and behavioral capabilities. Thus, the proposed test should not be read to
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
20. See infra Part III.B. l.a.
21. See Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), supra note 1.
22. See A Parent's Guide to Autism Spectrum Disorder, NAT'L INST. MENTAL
HEALTH, http://1.usa.gov/ljP7b7a (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (describing symptoms of
autism spectrum disorders, including social impairment, communication difficulties, and
repetitive and stereotyped behaviors).
23. See Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH,
http://l.usa.gov/19UEK6P (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (describing symptoms of PTSD
that typically manifest after a child sees or lives through a dangerous event, including
flashbacks, bad dreams, frightening thoughts, emotional numbness, loss of interest in
activities that were once enjoyable, and constant hyperarousal).
24. See Anxiety Disorders, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://l.usa.gov/ljvQsbq
(last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (describing symptoms of anxiety disorders, including panic




include more severe disorders, such as childhood disintegrative disorder
("CDD") 25 and profound mental retardation, 26 both of which may cause
children to become severely impaired and lose almost all communicative,
behavioral, and social functioning.27 While it is imperative that the
federal legislative and judicial systems consider in more depth possible
approaches to issues that may arise when severely developmentally
disabled children become the victims of crimes, such approaches are
beyond the scope of this Comment.
B. Probable Cause Generally
With regard to the testimony of competent adult witnesses and
informants, the U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a standard conception
of probable cause upon which all federal courts rely.28 Although the
Court adopted various tests throughout the years,29 it ultimately settled
on a fluid, "totality of the circumstances" approach in Illinois v. Gates,
30
which remains the controlling standard today.3'
The probable cause standard, which is a prerequisite for any search
or arrest warrant,12 is far less stringent than the finding of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" required for a conviction.33 Probable cause is a fluid
concept determined by the totality of the circumstances, and does not
require definitive proof of a crime.34 Rather, as indicated by its name,
probable cause only requires a "fair probability" or "substantial chance"
25. See Autism Spectrum Disorders Health Center, WEBMD,
http://on.webmd.comfYQuVzP (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). CDD is the most debilitating
of the autism spectrum disorders. Id. Symptoms include the loss of social, lingual, and
intellectual abilities. Id.
26. See Mental Retardation, N.Y. TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://nyti.ms/gZGhkE (last
visited Jan. 24, 2014) (describing symptoms of mental retardation that are more
pronounced in the profoundly retarded, including infant-like behavior, decreased learning
ability, and failure to meet the markers of intellectual development).
27. See sources cited supra notes 25-26.
28. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (adopting a "totality-of-the-
circumstances approach" to determinations of probable cause).
29. See generally, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
30. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
31. Although an in-depth exploration of probable cause in the context of adult
witnesses is beyond the scope of this Comment, a brief review of the standard serves as a
general framework and point of comparison for the forthcoming discussion of probable
cause vis-A-vis child and developmentally disabled witnesses.
32. See Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV.
951, 977 & n.144 (2003) (noting that the same probable cause standard applies to both
search and arrest warrants).
33. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 ("Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no
place in the magistrate's decision.").
34. Seeid.at230-31.
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of criminal activity, such that it is likely that a search will yield evidence
of a crime.
35
In determining whether probable cause exists, the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected complex, technical weighing tests36 in favor of a "totality
of the circumstances" approach. 37 A magistrate's task in reviewing an
affidavit of probable cause to determine whether to issue a search
warrant "is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,...
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place."'3 8 In sum, Gates permits magistrates to
employ a flexible inquiry in making probable cause determinations based
on the factual circumstances of each case.
C. Child Testimony Generally
Both U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence and statutory authority
have long confirmed the proposition that a child witness's young age
does not automatically render his testimony infirm or unreliable,39 and
that protections must be established with regard to such witnesses in
order to incentivize the reporting of crimes for which the only witness is
a child. 40 As mentioned previously, though, this authority focuses
predominantly on child testimony in the trial setting, and fails to
recognize the issues unique to victims and witnesses with developmental
disabilities.4'
1. Wheeler v. United States
42
In Wheeler v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the
longstanding common law standard with respect to child testimony: the
admission of such testimony is within the trial judge's discretion,
35. Seeid. at 243 n.13.
36. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969) (describing a two-
pronged test for probable cause determinations, requiring that the law enforcement officer
seeking a search warrant must inform the issuing magistrate: (1) of the reasons to
support the claim that the informant is credible and reliable; and (2) of the underlying
circumstances relied upon by the informant).
37. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31.
38. See id. at 238.
39. See Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895) ("That the boy was not
by reason of his youth, as a matter of law, absolutely disqualified as a witness is clear.").
40. See Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985)
(stating that policies tending to discount child testimony "only serve to discourage
children and parents from reporting molestation incidents").
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (providing no terms for either pre-
trial investigations or developmentally disabled victims and witnesses).
42. Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895).
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depending on the circumstances of the case.43 Although the Court did
not delineate a precise test for determining the competency of a child
witness, it did identify some factors that a trial judge may consider,44 and
emphasized that "there is no precise age which determines the question
of competency."
45
The Court concluded by stressing the policy behind admitting the
testimony of children, stating that "to exclude [a child] from the witness
stand... would sometimes result in staying the hand of justice.
' 46
Although many state courts and legislatures have adopted or enacted
standards that either clarify or slightly diverge from Wheeler, this
principle has retained its value over a century later.47
2. Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights at Federal Trials
The federal Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3509 ("Section 3509"),48 essentially codifies Wheeler's holding
by presuming the competency of child 49 witnesses. 50  The statute also
establishes specific protections for child witnesses, but only in the
context of trial.5" Such protections include, but are not limited to:
accompaniment of an adult, such as a parent, attorney, or guardian ad
litem; 52 use of testimonial aids, such as anatomical dolls or puppets; 53
and live testimony via two-way closed circuit television.
54
43. See id. at 524-26 (stating the proposition that youth does not, as a matter of law,
automatically disqualify the testimony of a child).
44. See id. (identifying factors that trial judges may consider in determining a child
witness's competency, including the child's capacity and intelligence, the child's
appreciation of the difference between truth and falsehood, and the child's
comprehension of the oath).
45. See id. at 524.
46. See id. at 526.
47. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 595.02(n) (2008) (creating a rebuttable presumption that
a witness under ten years of age is competent to testify); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20
(McKinney 2003) (creating a rebuttable presumption that a witness under nine years of
age is not competent to testify); see also Julie Oseid, Defendants'Rights in Child Witness
Competency Hearings: Establishing Constitutional Procedures for Sexual Abuse Cases,
69 MINN. L. REv. 1377, 1381 (1985) (addressing concerns about the competency of child
witnesses in the context of Minnesota statutes and caselaw); Laurie Shanks, Evaluating
Children 's Competency to Testify: Developing a Rational Method to Assess a Young
Child's Capacity to Offer Reliable Testimony in Cases Alleging Child Sex Abuse, 58
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 575, 581-83 (2010) (discussing various legislative and judicial
standards for admissibility of child testimony at trial).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
49. See id. § 3509(a)(2)(A)-(B) (defining "child" as "a person who is under the age
of 18, who is or is alleged to be[:] (A) a victim of a crime of physical abuse, sexual
abuse, or exploitation; or (B) a witness to a crime committed against another person").
50. See id. § 3509(c)(2).
51. See generally id. § 3509 (providing no terms for pre-trial investigations, such as
forensic interviews).
52. See id. § 3509(c)(5)(E).
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While Section 3509 does not establish protections for child victims
or witnesses during pre-trial investigations, it does demonstrate that
Congress has, in the past, been willing to stand up for these vulnerable
victims by creating a consistent federal standard in the context of trial."
Section 3509 also serves as a useful blueprint for crafting the legislation
this Comment proposes.56
D. Sufficiency of Child Testimony to Establish Probable Cause
Several federal courts of appeals have directly addressed the issue
of whether child testimony is sufficient to establish probable cause for a
search warrant. A brief overview of these cases will develop a
background on this area of law and help determine what elements future
legislation should retain and discard.
1. Easton v. City of Boulder, Colorado
57
Daniel Easton was arrested for two alleged sexual assaults of a child
who lived in the same apartment complex as Easton, once in Easton's
apartment and once in the complex's laundry room. The Boulder,
Colorado, police conducted an investigation, but formal charges were
never filed.58 Subsequently, Easton filed a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. §
198359 ("Section 1983") against the city and individual police officers,
alleging that the police had no probable cause for the arrest, and that the
arrest therefore violated Easton's Fourth Amendment 6° right to be free
from unreasonable seizures.6' In determining whether the police acted
recklessly during the course of the investigation and arrest, the issue
arose as to whether the testimony of two children, aged three and five,
was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause for a valid search
62warrant.
Upon review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that the children's testimony was valid and more than adequate to
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(l) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
54. See id. § 3509(b)(1).
55. See generally id. § 3509.
56. See infra Parts II.B-C.
57. Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1985).
58. Seeid. at 1446.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing relief, in the form of monetary damages, to
an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated by a state actor).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ....
61. See Easton, 776 F.2d at 1447-48.
62. See id. at 1449.
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establish probable cause for Easton's arrest.63 Although the court did not
set forth a formal test, it did identify some factors that contributed to the
ultimate finding of probable cause. 64
First, the court swiftly rejected Easton's assertion that, because the
boys whose testimony was at issue were three and five years old, "their
testimony was somehow suspect to begin with., 65 Much like the U.S.
Supreme Court's reasoning in Wheeler,66 the Easton court called the
argument "an entirely unacceptable point of view" from a public policy
standpoint, as child testimony is often the only tool to establish probable
cause in cases of child abuse.67 The court further explained that, in order
to incentivize the reporting of such crimes, a bright-line age rule is
68inappropriate.
Second, the Easton court did not automatically discount the
children's testimony because of the presence of some inconsistencies;
rather, it adopted what the author of this Comment will refer to as the
"solid core" test.69 So long as the "solid core" of a child's testimony
remains consistent, minor contradictions will not render it invalid or
unreliable. 70 The court noted that even adult witnesses and informants
are granted some leniency in this regard, as "[a] certain amount of
inconsistency in the evidence is almost inevitable."71 Additionally, even
in the more stringent context of a trial, testimony need not be infallible.72
Lastly, in finding the children's testimony credible, the court noted
that their statements were spontaneous-that is, they were not the result
of leading questions or suggestions posed by adults. The court further
found the testimony credible because the children had knowledge of
63. See id. at 1451 ("Upon this record the arrest was clearly lawful.").
64. See id. at 1449-50.
65. See id. at 1449.
66. See supra Part II.C.1.
67. See Easton, 776 F.2d at 1449.
68. See id. ("To discount such testimony from the outset would only serve to
discourage children and parents from reporting molestation incidents and to unjustly
insulate the perpetrator of such crimes from prosecution.").
69. See id. at 1450.
70. See id. For example, in Easton, the "solid core" of the children's testimony was
their identification of the apartment in which Easton resided and their description of the
sexual assault that occurred in the laundry room, including the detail that the assault
occurred in a "blanket tent" that Easton had constructed. See id. at 1443-44, 1450.
Minor contradictions, which the court ultimately deemed excusable, included the boys'
description of Easton's hair color and some details surrounding the sexual assault that
allegedly occurred in Easton's apartment. See id. at 1444, 1449-50.
71. See id. (citing In re A.H.B., 491 A.2d 490, 495 (D.C. 1985)).
72. See Easton, 776 F.2d at 1450 ("We would indeed be amiss if we were to hold
police officers and magistrates to a stricter standard [than trial judges] when evaluating
evidence for a probable cause determination.").
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things that children their age could not possibly know otherwise,7 3 and
their statements were corroborated by each other and adults.74
In sum, the Easton court advocated an "appropriately relaxed"
probable cause standard for child victims and witnesses. 7 While
testimony must meet the "solid core" test to ensure procedural
protections for the accused, minor inconsistencies are excusable as a
matter of public policy.
76
2. Stoot v. City of Everett
77
In Stoot v. City of Everett, a four-year-old girl, A.B., accused a 14-
year-old male acquaintance, Paul, of sexually abusing her.78 Although
the charges were eventually dropped, Paul sued the city, alleging Fourth
Amendment violations.79 The issue arose as to whether A.B.'s testimony
alleging molestation was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause
for Paul's arrest.80
Based on three factors, the Stoot court held that A.B.'s statements
were not sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause:81 (1) A.B. was
only four years old at the time of the interview, during which she
recounted events said to have occurred when she was three years old;82
(2) A.B. changed answers throughout the interview; 83 and, (3) at one
point, A.B. confused Paul with another boy, Preston. 84 The court
concluded that "[t]hese three circumstances, considered together, point to
the need for further investigation and corroboration to establish probable
cause."
85
The defendant, City of Everett, relied on Easton to support its
proposition that police may rely on the somewhat inconsistent statements
of child victims to establish probable cause. 86 The court responded by
73. See id. at 1450.
74. See id. at 1449.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1450.
77. Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2009).
78. See id. at 913.
79. See id. at 924; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
80. See Stoot, 582 F.3d at 918.
81. See id. at 919 ("[T]hree factors, taken together, compel the conclusion that the
statements made by A.B.... were not sufficiently trustworthy or reliable to establish
probable cause on their own.").
82. See id. ("Common experience counsels extreme caution in crediting detailed
recollections of events said to have occurred at such an extremely young age, particularly
those reported over a year later by a child still very young.").
83. See id. at 920.
84. See id.




asserting that "Easton simply cannot bear the weight placed upon it by
defendants in this case," identifying two factors present in Easton not
present in Stoot: (1) "substantial evidence corroborating the victim's
statements of alleged abuse"; and (2) the testimony of another child
witness.
87
Although, due to slightly distinguishable facts, the two cases are not
irreconcilable, Stoot seems to be less sympathetic than Easton to child
witnesses and victims whose testimony does not achieve perfect
consistency. 88 Certain commonalities emerge from the two cases,
however, and they provide a backdrop for further exploration of issues
stemming from the use of testimony of child and developmentally
disabled witnesses and victims.
3. Other Relevant Caselaw
Other federal courts of appeals have addressed the issue of the use
of child testimony to establish probable cause for a search or arrest
warrant.89 Because these courts dealt with the issue in a similar manner
to the Easton and Stoot courts, a short overview of this caselaw will
suffice.
a. United States v. Shaw9°
In United States v. Shaw, a three-year-old boy claimed that
defendant Brendan Shaw "touched his pee-pee" and that Shaw's "pee-
pee had touched his butt." 91 Following an investigation, Shaw was
arrested and charged with child sexual abuse in a ten-count indictment,
which eventually resulted in an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit on the issue of whether the boy's statements provided
probable cause for Shaw's arrest.
92
Ultimately, the Shaw court determined that the three-year-old boy's
testimony was insufficient to establish probable cause. 93 In most
circumstances, an eyewitness's statement that he or she was the victim of
a crime suffices to establish probable cause.94 The Shaw court, however,
concluded that courts have never considered the uncorroborated hearsay
87. Id. at 921.
88. See id.
89. See United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2006); Marx v. Gumbinner,
905 F.2d 1503 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987).
90. United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2006).
91. Id. at 618.
92. See id. at 617.
93. See id. at 624.
94. See id. at 623.
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statement 95 of a child as young as three, standing alone, sufficient to
establish probable cause. 96 The court acknowledged that a three-year-old
boy's testimony was considered credible in Easton, but distinguished it
from this case on the basis that adults and a five-year-old boy
corroborated that testimony, whereas here the child's testimony stood
alone. 97 While the Shaw majority denied that its opinion created a
bright-line test for the exclusion of testimony of children three and
under, 98 the dissent reproached the majority for discounting otherwise
valid testimony on that basis alone. 99
b. Marx v. Gumbinnerl
°°
In Marx v. Gumbinner, a severely injured and traumatized four-
year-old girl who had just been raped said, "'Daddy did this to me,' and
'Daddy left me outside to sleep in my nightgown, and he did this to
me." 0'' 1 In a subsequent civil wrongful arrest lawsuit, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether these statements
were sufficient to establish probable cause for the victim's father's
arrest.
02
The court found that the victim's statements established probable
cause for the father's arrest. 10 3 Citing Easton, the Marx court reiterated
that "considering the statements of child sexual abuse victims to be
inherently suspect is 'an entirely unacceptable point of view."' 104
Supported by a Florida statute providing that the testimony of a sexual
assault victim need not be corroborated,' °5 the court held that officers
were reasonable in relying on the child's testimony despite her age,
injuries, and trauma. 1
06
95. See Shaw, 464 F.3d at 624-25 (noting that police never interviewed the alleged
child victim, and instead relied solely on the mother's repetition of statements that the
child made to her).
96. See id. at 624.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 633 (Sutton, J., dissenting) ("I realize the majority disclaims
announcing such a bright-line rule, but I cannot see any other reason for the decision.").
100. Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503 (11 th Cir. 1990).
101. See id. at 1504-05.
102. See id. at 1504.
103. See id at 1506.
104. See id. (quoting Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir.
1985)).
105. See Marx, 905 F.2d at 1506 (citing FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1990)).
106. See id. ("[W]e believe that [the child's] statements could not be disregarded and
that her statements supported defendants' conclusion that probable cause existed.").
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c. Myers v. Morris
10 7
The Myers v. Morris court assessed "the consolidated appeals in
eight civil rights lawsuits which grew out of a child sexual abuse
investigation.' ' 8 As a result of several key factors, the court determined
that probable cause existed in each of the individual cases on appeal.' 09
Each arrest was based on the testimony of at least two children."1 °
Further, the court noted that the declarants in question were between five
and twelve years old, and courts generally consider children within this
age range to be more reliable than younger children. " Lastly, a
Minnesota statute, like the Florida statute mentioned above," 2 provides
that the testimony of a juvenile victim in a sexual abuse prosecution need
not be corroborated." 13
Like nearly every other federal court of appeals that has dealt with
probable cause in the context of child declarants, the Morris court
emphasized that, as a policy matter, courts must not write off the
testimony of children as per se unreliable.' 14 This policy, combined with
the factors listed above, allowed the Morris court to make a relatively
straightforward finding of probable cause.'
E. State Statutory Approaches
16
State legislatures have tackled issues related to the admissibility of
testimony of the child and developmentally disabled victims of abuse in
a variety of ways. Two important categories of state legislation that
could inform a potential federal approach are anti-corroboration rules
and hearsay exception rules.
107. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987).
108. See id. at 1440.
109. See id. at 1457.
110. See id. at 1456 ("In no case did an arrest occur on the basis of only one child's
account....").
111. See id.
112. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
113. See Morris, 810 F.2d at 1456 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (1984)).
114. See id. at 1456-57 ("As for the suggestion that the age and particular
vulnerabilities of young children should render their statements less credible, we reject
the inference that law enforcement personnel are necessarily less entitled to rely on
details of criminal activity described by children than those described by adults.").
115. See id. at 1457 ("In light of the facts and circumstances before the deputies, we
conclude that their conduct in seeking and performing the arrests was objectively
reasonable.").
116. Because this Comment focuses on a standard for testimony of children and those
with developmentally disabilities at the federal level, a thorough exploration of state
legislation is beyond its scope. A brief overview of pertinent state legislation, however,
is useful in developing a potential federal approach.
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1. Anti-Corroboration Rules
Sir Matthew Hale, an influential seventeenth century British jurist,
famously claimed "that an allegation of rape is 'easily to be made and
hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho
never so innocent.', 11 7 Fortunately this sentiment has dissipated over the
centuries, but the legislative and judicial requirement that claims of rape
be corroborated in order to secure a conviction remained largely in place
until the 1970s, and was even adopted by the Model Penal Code.1 8
As one can imagine, this requirement proved problematic because
instances of rape and sexual abuse, especially those of children,
firequently occur in private with no witnesses other than the abuser and
the victim. 119 Today, no state requires corroboration as a matter of
evidentiary proof to secure conviction at trial, 120 which is reflected in
state legislation and evidentiary rules.
121
2. Hearsay Exception Rules
Recognizing the unique difficulties that child and developmentally
disabled victims face when testifying in open court, most states 122 have
enacted exceptions to the hearsay rule 123 for such testimony. 124 As a
result of these exceptions, certain out-of-court statements by victims and
witnesses that a court would otherwise exclude may be admitted at
trial. 1 25 By recognizing the stress that testifying places on vulnerable
117. Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating
Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REv. 981, 985 (2008) (quoting SIR
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 635 (London Professional
Books 1971) (1736)).
118. Seeid.at986.
119. See id, at 1052.
120. See id. at 987.
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1) (1994) (establishing that the testimony of a
victim need not be corroborated in sexual battery cases); MINN. STAT. § 609.347(1)
(2010) (same).
122. See, e.g., MICH. CT. RULE § 3.972(C)(2) (2007) (creating an exception to the
hearsay rule for statements made by children under ten years old or incapacitated
individuals under 18 years old with developmental disabilities); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
16-221 (2007) (creating an exception to the hearsay rule if the declarant is an individual
with a developmental disability who is the victim or witness of an alleged sexual offense
or other crime of violence).
123. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c) (defining "hearsay" as "a statement that: (1) the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party
offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement"); see also id.
802 (stating that hearsay is generally not admissible unless a valid exception applies).




victims 126 and adapting the rules accordingly, such "tender years"
hearsay exceptions incentivize children to testify against their abusers.1
2 7
Further, the exceptions ensure that trustworthy, probative statements are
not excluded from trial.1
28
III. PROPOSAL: A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL SOLUTION
A. A Lack of Consistency: Problems with the Existing "Patchwork"
System
1. Failure to Address Developmental Disabilities
Neither the federal court system nor Congress has produced
meaningful caselaw or legislation regarding the treatment of statements
of child victims and witnesses with developmental disabilities during the
pre-trial stages of an investigation. 129 Congress did enact a federal
statute governing the use of child testimony at trial, 3 ° but it has yet to
address the unique needs of developmentally disabled victims and
witnesses. 3 '
2. Inconsistency Among Circuits
As described above, a number of federal courts of appeals have
addressed the issue of the sufficiency of child testimony to establish
probable cause for a warrant. 32 Certain general principles have emerged
from these cases: (1) corroboration of testimony increases the likelihood
that a court will consider the testimony of a child sufficient to establish
probable cause; 133 (2) courts express particular concern regarding the
testimony of children aged three and younger; 134 (3) courts hesitate to
endorse findings of probable cause based on the testimony of a child who
is confused as to the identity of his or her abuser; 135 and (4) minor
126. See id. at 225 ("A number of researchers have suggested that some children are
traumatized by the courtroom experience.").
127. See id.
128. See id. at 226.
129. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
130. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
131. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
132. See supra Part II.D.
133. See Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 920 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 624 (6th Cir. 2006); Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11 th
Cir. 1990); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1456 (8th Cir. 1987); Easton v. City of
Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985).
134. See Stoot, 582 F.3d at 919; Shaw, 464 F.3d at 624. But see id. at 633 (Sutton, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority authorizes, in practice, an improper bright-line rule
excluding the testimony of children three and under).
135. See Stoot, 582 F.3d at 920.
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inconsistencies within a child's testimony are not fatal to a finding of
probable cause. 136 These similarities suggest that future federal
legislation can achieve a consistent rule across all 50 states.
Despite wide acceptance of these general principles, courts apply
them inconsistently, and certain courts have valued or discounted
evidence that other courts would likely have treated differently. The
Marx court seemed prepared to deem the uncorroborated statements of a
traumatized four-year-old child sufficient to establish probable cause.
137
The Stoot and Shaw courts, on the other hand, expressed more concern
about the statements of very young children, tending to discount the
uncorroborated statements of three- and four-year-old victims more
readily than the Marx court. 138 These inconsistencies demonstrate the
need for legislative intervention.
B. A Federal Standard for the Testimony of Child and
Developmentally Disabled Victims During Pre-Trial Stages of
Investigation
The variability of judicial standards between circuits regarding the
sufficiency of child testimony and the virtual nonexistence of authority
regarding the sufficiency of testimony of developmentally disabled child
victims and witnesses create uncertainty and unpredictability for judges,
practitioners of law, and members of the general public. 139 This
uncertainty is especially problematic given the volume of federal
criminal prosecutions that tend to rely on testimony provided by child
and developmentally disabled victims. 1 40 Further, state and local sex
136. See id.; Easton, 776 F.2d at 1450.
137. See Marx, 905 F.2d at 1506 ("[W]e believe that [the four-year-old victim]'s
statements could not be disregarded and that her statements supported defendants'
conclusion that probable cause existed."). The court was not required to rule decisively
on this issue, however, because other evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause.
Id. at 1507.
138. See Stoot, 582 F.3d at 920 ("In cases involving very young child victims, the
courts have repeatedly emphasized the need for some evidence in addition to the
statements of the victim to corroborate the allegations and establish probable cause.");
Shaw, 464 F.3d at 624 ("We are not aware . . . of any situation in which the
uncorroborated hearsay statement of a child as young as three, standing alone, has been
considered sufficient to establish probable cause."). Recall, however, that in Shaw, the
police based their seizure of the suspect solely on a mother's report that her son had told
her that the suspect had molested him, and that police did not conduct an interview with
the child prior to the suspect's arrest. See id. at 625. Shaw is therefore distinguishable
from Marx and the other cited cases based on this factor. See id. at 624-26.
139. See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text.
140. See generally, e.g., Obscene Visual Representations of the Sexual Abuse of
Children, 18 U.S.C. § 1466A (2006); Sexual Abuse of a Minor or Ward, id. § 2243 (2006
& Supp. 2007); Sexual Exploitation of Children, id. § 2251 (2006 & Supp. 2008); Certain
Activities Relating to Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of Minors, id. § 2252;
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crime investigations often enter the federal court system by way of
alleged abusers' suits against state and local authorities under Section
1983, claiming constitutional violations throughout such
investigations. 14'
Absent a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court addressing these
issues, which does not appear to be forthcoming, congressional
legislation presents the best vehicle for an across-the-board federal
standard. This proposal amalgamates strengths from existing federal
caselaw 142 and statutory materials 43 into a concise, non-dispositive factor
test that federal judges can easily and consistently apply. This proposal
also incorporates concepts from various state corroboration 144 and
hearsay exceptions, 45 and thus ensures that reliable, probative evidence
is not wrongfully excluded.
1. Factor Test
Of the five federal cases examined above, only Stoot delineated a
factor test detailing an organized approach to the issue of the sufficiency
of child testimony to establish probable cause. 146 This test, however,
consisted of only three factors: age of declarant, consistency of
statements, and accuracy of identification. 147 As demonstrated by the
other cases mentioned above, the Stoot test is inadequate, as additional
factors may be useful to a court's ultimate determination of probable
cause.
As a result, this Comment proposes a flexible test with six factors to
guide federal judges in making such determinations. Nearly all federal
courts that have dealt with the sufficiency of child testimony emphasized
the notion that rigid tests, especially age cutoffs, do not mesh well with
as fluid a concept as probable cause. 148 Likewise, a bright-line
Certain Activities Relating to Material Constituting or Containing Child Pornography, id.
§ 2252A (2006 & Supp. 2009).
141. See generally, e.g., Stoot, 582 F.3d 910 (alleging violations of suspected child
molester's constitutional rights during investigation); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437
(8th Cir. 1987) (same); Easton, 776 F.2d 1441 (same).
142. See Stoot, 582 F.3d at 920; Shaw, 464 F.3d at 624; Marx, 905 F.2d at 1506;
Morris, 810 F.2d at 1456; Easton, 776 F.2d at 1449.
143. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
144. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1) (1994); MINN. STAT. § 609.347(1) (2010).
145. See, e.g., MICH. CT. RULE § 3.972(C)(2) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-221
(2007).
146. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
147. See Stoot, 582 F.3d at 919-20.
148. See Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985) ("To
discount [the testimony of very young children] from the outset would only serve to
discourage children and parents from reporting molestation incidents and to unjustly
insulate the perpetrator of such crimes from prosecution."); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462
2014]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
presumption against the testimony of children with developmental
disabilities would be equally inappropriate, as reliability will depend on
the disorder, symptoms, and circumstances of a particular child. 149
Under this proposed test, if more factors are present, it is more likely that
a court will uphold a finding of probable cause. However, no one factor
is dispositive to such a finding, thus maintaining the spirit of the
comprehensive approach to probable cause determinations espoused by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Gates.'5"
a. Age
It is undeniable that, generally, the younger a child is, the less
capable he or she will be at relaying events and information reliably. 15'
To say that the testimony of a child of a certain age is per se unreliable,
however, contradicts the dual goals of prosecuting child abusers and
guaranteeing justice for victims. 
5 2
In many child molestation cases, "the only available evidence that a
crime has been committed is the testimony of children," so a per se age
cutoff rule could have the perverse effect of incentivizing the abuse of
very young children. 53 Making consideration of the victim or witness's
age part of a factor test allows federal judges and other practitioners of
law to realistically view the totality of the circumstances in order to reach
a just result. For example, the testimony of a four-year-old child,
alongside other factors, may be sufficient to uphold a finding of probable
cause. 114 Conversely, the testimony of a three-year-old child as
recounted by his mother, with little other evidence, may not be
sufficient.1
55
When the child whose testimony is at issue has a developmental
disability, age is still a valid and important factor to consider, but it must
be viewed alongside the unique symptoms of the child's disorder. For
example, while a child with normal cognitive development typically
U.S. 213, 235 (1983) ("Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt
or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the
magistrate's decision.").
149. See supra notes 21-24.
150. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 (adopting a "totality-of-the-circumstances approach"
to determinations of probable cause); see also supra Part Il.B.
151. See, e.g., Shanks, supra note 47, at 586-87 ("[R]esearchers... found that young
children (under age eight) had more difficulty than older children and adults in
distinguishing between imagined events and those that actually occurred.").
152. See Easton, 776 F.2d at 1449.
153. Id.; see also Shanks, supra note 47, at 580 ("Although some egregious cases of
sexual abuse may involve vaginal or rectal tearing, many allegations of sexual abuse
involve improper touching or fondling.").
154. See Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1990).
155. See United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 624 (6th Cir. 2006).
[Vol. 118:3
VULNERABLE VICTIMS
attends high school through the age of 18, public schools have a
responsibility to provide services for children with autism spectrum
disorders until the age of 22, demonstrating that children with
developmental disabilities mature and progress differently than other
children. 56 Thus, courts must evaluate how a developmentally disabled
child's age affects the reliability of his testimony within the totality of
the circumstances.
57
b. Accuracy of Identification
Courts should also consider the accuracy with which child victims
or witnesses identify suspected abusers. Given the fact that even adult
victims and witnesses frequently misidentify suspects, leading to
wrongful arrests and convictions, 158 courts should be wary of finding
probable cause when a child victim or witness is unable to accurately or
consistently identify a suspected abuser.159 This factor should apply in
largely the same manner regardless of the child's behavioral, cognitive,
and communicative abilities. In many cases involving child victims or
witnesses, this factor does not pose a problem, especially because "[t]he
accused is often an intimate of the child, typically a family member,
friend, or neighbor." 160 Similarly, children with developmental
disabilities will often be able to identify their abusers accurately and
without issue. 161 However, when a child or developmentally disabled
victim or witness cannot consistently or accurately identify his or her
abuser, the possibility of a wrongful arrest or conviction should concern
the court due to the grave ramifications for persons who are wrongfully
convicted.
62
156. See A Parent's Guide to Autism Spectrum Disorder, supra note 22.
157. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
158. Jules Epstein, The Great Engine that Couldn't: Science, Mistaken
Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REv. 727, 730-31
(2007).
159. See Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the
child's inability to consistently name her abuser raised "serious concerns about the
veracity and reliability of [her] allegation" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
160. Shanks, supra note 47, at 580.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Kofalt, No. 11-155, 2012 WL 5398832, at *4 (W.D.
Pa. Nov. 2, 2012) (describing instance in which a child with "severe behavioral
problems" accurately and voluntarily identified the defendant as his abuser (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
162. See Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Burden of
Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. MIcH.
J.L. REFORM 123, 129 (discussing obstacles that wrongfully convicted persons face if
they are able to obtain their freedom, including debt and unemployment).
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c. Presence or Absence of Corroborating Evidence
In every state, it is possible to secure a conviction against a
defendant accused of rape without any corroborating evidence. 163
Because a finding of probable cause need not meet the stringent "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard required for a conviction, it follows that it
is likewise possible to make a valid finding of probable cause without
corroborating evidence. 64
Despite this, every court whose opinion this Comment examines
places a great deal of emphasis-arguably, too much emphasis--on the
value of corroborating evidence. 165 While the presence of corroborating
evidence will undoubtedly buttress a finding of probable cause, this
proposal suggests that future federal legislation should formally adopt a
corroboration exception similar to those adopted by Florida and
Minnesota. 166 This aspect of the proposal will be discussed at length
below. 167
In a case where the court is evaluating the reliability of the
testimony of a child with a developmental disability, corroborating
evidence may prove to be especially important. Where there is concern
due to the child's inability to remember details or focus during an
interview due to a disorder such as ADHD, the presence or absence of
corroborating evidence may be the tiebreaker that determines whether
the testimony is sufficient or insufficient to establish probable cause.
168
Depending on whether the other factors of this test establish reliability,
however, not all cases will require the corroboration of a
developmentally disabled child's testimony. 1
69
163. See Klein, supra note 117, at 987.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 634 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999)). Judge Sutton
noted:
In murder and rape cases, one does not need corroborating evidence at the
probable-cause stage to support the testimony of someone who witnessed (or
experienced) the crime. Eyewitness testimony alone will suffice, unless there
is reason for "the officer to believe that the eyewitness was lying, did not
accurately describe what he had seem, or was in some fashion mistaken
regarding his recollection."
1d.
165. See, e.g., Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506-07 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating
that the child victim's uncorroborated statements supported the conclusion that probable
cause existed, but going on to list examples of corroborating evidence as well).
166. See FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1990); MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (1984).
167. See infra Part III.B.2.
168. See United States v. Kofalt, No. 11-155, 2012 WL 5398832, at *9 (W.D. Pa.
Nov. 2, 2012) (considering statements made to school officials by a six-year-old boy with
ADHD to corroborate his testimony during a forensic interview).
169. See State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1984) (stating that
corroboration of a child's testimony is only required if other evidence is insufficient).
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d. Length of Time Between Alleged Abuse and Testimony
As with an adult, "a child's memory may have faded with the
passage of time." 170 Therefore, courts may view statements made
immediately after or shortly following abuse as presumptively more
reliable than statements made months or years after abuse. 
171
That being said, a per se rule that automatically excludes testimony
based on the length of time between the alleged abuse and the child's
testimony would not serve the administration of justice. Although a
child's recollection may well be reliable despite the passage of time,
172
children have unique difficulties with the concept of time that make it
more challenging for them to defmitively recall when an event
occurred. 173 Thus, courts must approach this factor with caution; in
situations where a child's testimony takes place some time after an
alleged abusive incident, courts must be sure to carefully balance all six
factors within the "totality of the circumstances."'
' 74
Depending on whether a child's developmental disability affects her
capacity to retain long-term memories, courts may view a longer gap
between the abusive incident and the child's testimony with greater
skepticism. 17 Studies suggest, however, that many children with
developmental disabilities have adequately functioning long-term
170. Lynn McLain, "Sweet Childish Days": Using Developmental Psychology
Research in Evaluating the Admissibility of Out-of-Court Statements by Young Children,
64 ME. L. REv. 77, 98 (2011) (identifying problems that arise when there is a long delay
between an abusive incident and testimony regarding that incident).
171. Compare Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 919-20 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Common experience counsels extreme caution in crediting [a four-year-old victim's]
detailed recollections of events said to have occurred ... eighteen months earlier, when
she was three years old."), with Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir.
1990) (stating that police "acted properly in placing a reasonable amount of trust in the
truth of [the four-year-old victim's] statements" when the statements were made
immediately following the alleged abuse).
172. See, e.g., Marcia K. Johnson & Mary Ann Foley, Differentiating Fact from
Fantasy: The Reliability of Children's Memory, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 33, 35 (1984) ("[T]here
is little evidence that children's lower recall reflects a defect in the memory system
itself.").
173. See John E.B. Myers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination,
Cross-Examination, and Impeachment, 18 PAC. L.J. 801, 827 (1987) ("Young children
have difficulty with the concept of time. The year, date or time-of-day when an event
occurred may have no meaning or importance to a child." (footnote omitted)).
174. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983); see also Stoot, 582 F.3d at 920
(suggesting that the passage of time does not render testimony per se unreliable, but
instead demonstrates a "need for further investigation and corroboration to establish
probable cause").
175. See, e.g., Stoot, 582 F.3d at 920 (finding that the child's testimony was
insufficient to establish probable cause due to an 18-month gap between the alleged
abusive incident and child's testimony).
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memories, so courts must consider this factor within the specific
circumstances of each child's disorder and symptoms. 
176
e. Spontaneity of Statements
Younger children are generally "more vulnerable to the deleterious
effects of an interviewer's misleading suggestions" than older children
and adults.' 77 In other words, a young child's memories may be altered
or falsified by adults' suggestions, be they from parents or
interviewers. 17' For this reason, courts generally favor a child's
unprompted, spontaneous statements regarding an abusive incident over
statements made upon the suggestion of an adult. 179 This sentiment
applies to statements made by children with developmental disabilities as
well. 180 Testimony prompted by adults' questioning, however, is often of
crucial importance to ultimate findings of probable cause, especially due
to its corroborative capacity, and thus also deserves the attention of the
court.
18 1
f. Experiential Nature of Statements
The sixth and final factor for the proposed "totality of the
circumstances" test concerns whether a child's statements, including the
statements of a child with a developmental disability, express events or
vocabulary that he or she could only know through experience. 82 It is
176. See, e.g., Sally Ozonoff & David L. Strayer, Further Evidence ofIntact Working
Memory in Autism, 31 J. AUTISM & DEV. DISORDERS 257, 257 (2001) (stating that, while
prior studies have found "mixed evidence of working memory impairment in autism," the
authors' study concluded that "working memory is not one of the executive functions that
is seriously impaired in autism").
177. Livia L. Gilstrap & Michael P. McHenry, Using Experts to Aid Jurors in
Assessing Child Witness Credibility, COLO. LAW., Aug. 2006, at 65, 68 ("Factors such as
question repetition, use of yes/no questions, misleading questions, repeated interviewing,
plausible suggestions, stereotyping, anatomical dolls, and invocation of peer conformity
all have been associated with errors in children's reports to adult interviewers.").
178. See McLain, supra note 170, at 114.
179. See Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1443, 1450 (10th Cir.
1985) (upholding finding of probable cause based on victim's "spontaneous,"
unprompted statements to his stepfather indicating abuse by a neighbor).
180. See United States v. Kofalt, No. 11-155, 2012 WL 5398832, at *9 (W.D. Pa.
Nov. 2, 2012) (considering statements made by a six-year-old victim with ADHD during
a forensic interview to be more credible because they were consistent with spontaneous
statements the child had previously made to school officials).
181. See Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1442 (8th Cir. 1987) (detailing testimony
acquired during interviews with victims of abuse that supported a finding of probable
cause); see also Kofalt, 2012 WL 5398832, at *9 (noting that a subsequent forensic
interview corroborated what the child victim with ADHD had told school officials).
182. See Easton, 776 F.2d at 1450-51 (upholding the magistrate's finding of probable
cause due, in part, to the child victim's description of sexual assault that was beyond the
scope of knowledge for a typical child of his age); see also Melinda Smith & Jeanne
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important to note, though, that many children describe abusive incidents
using age-appropriate vocabulary, so this factor will not apply in every
case; it should rather be viewed as an exceptional "red flag" that is
especially indicative of abuse.'83
2. Corroboration Exception
State statutory provisions establishing that the testimony of a victim
need not be corroborated in a sex crimes prosecution1 84 provide a clear
model for a similar federal provision permitting a finding of probable
cause without corroboration. Courts have upheld such provisions during
criminal trials where the most demanding "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard governs.185 Thus, there is little doubt that courts would uphold
an anti-corroboration provision to support a finding of probable cause
during the pre-trial stages of a criminal investigation 186 where the
governing standard is significantly more flexible. 
87
Of course, any statute must account for defendants' constitutional
rights; police officers, magistrates, and judges must not take advantage of
an anti-corroboration provision by finding probable cause in situations in
which it is clearly not present. 188 In the trial context, criminal defendants
commonly express concern that, without corroboration, evidence is
insufficient to uphold a conviction. 189 To reiterate, however, the
probable cause standard is less rigid than the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard required at a criminal trial. 190
Segal, Child Abuse & Neglect: Recognizing, Preventing, and Reporting Child Abuse,
HELPGUIDE, http://bit.ly/5RHk2 (last updated Aug. 2013) (listing warning signs of sexual
abuse in children, including a display of "knowledge or interest in sexual acts
inappropriate to [the child's] age").
183. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 618 (6th Cir. 2006) (recounting
the child's use of the term "pee-pee" in his description of an abusive incident).
184. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1) (1994) (establishing that the testimony of a
victim need not be corroborated in sexual battery cases); MINN. STAT. § 609.347(1)
(2010) (same).
185. See State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1984) ("Corroboration of an
allegation of sexual abuse of a child is required only if the evidence otherwise adduced is
insufficient to sustain conviction.").
186. See, e.g., State v. Pao Yang, No. Al1-1910, 2012 WL 5476105, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Nov. 13, 2012) (upholding defendant's conviction for second-degree criminal
sexual conduct, citing statutory provision eliminating corroboration requirement).
187. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) ("Finely-tuned standards such as
proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal
trials, have no place in the magistrate's decision.").
188. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Pao Yang, 2012 WL 5476105, at *2-3 (rejecting defendant's argument
that evidence is insufficient to uphold conviction without corroboration).
190. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 235.
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Also, other measures already serve to ensure the sufficiency of
evidence without an express requirement of corroboration. For example,
various state courts have held that a victim's accurate identification of
the defendant and positive testimony of sexual abuse are strong
indicators of reliability, rendering corroborating testimony less
necessary. 191 As stated by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
"[c]orroboration of an allegation of sexual abuse of a child is required
only if the evidence otherwise adduced is insufficient to sustain
conviction." 192 If the evidence is sufficient without corroboration,
though, it does not serve the interest of justice to impose an antiquated
corroboration requirement on the victim. 193 This same policy should
apply to the testimony of all children, including those with
developmental disabilities.
Implementing the "solid core" test from Easton is the best way to
ensure the reliability of children's testimony without a corroboration
requirement. 194 This test, which allows for minor irregularities within
otherwise consistent testimony, 195 grants a necessary amount of leniency
to child victims, including those with developmental disabilities, who
may be forgetful or inconsistent due to trauma, disorder, or the passage
of time. At the same time, the test retains the notion that probable cause
requires a "fair probability" that a crime was committed. 196 So long as
the "solid core" of a child's testimony remains consistent throughout an
investigation, corroboration is not required to support a finding of
probable cause.' 
97
3. "Tender Years" Hearsay Exception
As previously discussed, 198 some states have enacted statutory
provisions excepting children, including those with developmental
disabilities, from the general rule against the admission of hearsay
191. See Saleem v. State, 773 So.2d 89, 89-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) ("A victim's
testimony concerning a sexual battery, if clear as to the identity of the perpetrator, is
legally sufficient to sustain a conviction and requires no medical or other
corroboration."); State v. Pirir, No. A10- 1161, 2012 WL 896262, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Mar. 19, 2012) (upholding first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction without
corroboration because the victim gave positive, consistent testimony of sexual abuse).
192. State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1984).
193. See Klein, supra note 117, at 985-86 (discussing the history of the legislative and
judicial requirement that claims of rape be corroborated, and noting the universal trend
toward elimination of the corroboration requirement).
194. See Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1985); see
also supra notes 69-72, 76 and accompanying text.
195. See Easton, 776 F.2d at 1450.
196. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 246 (1983).
197. See Easton, 776 F.2d at 1450.
198. See supra Part II.E.2.
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evidence during trial. 199 The author proposes that a similar provision
should be incorporated into a federal standard for probable cause during
the pre-trial stages of an investigation involving child witnesses and
victims. Courts have consistently upheld exceptions to the hearsay rule
for children, known as "tender years" exceptions, in the context of
trial,2°° making it extremely likely that courts would likewise hold such
an exception valid as part of a test for the more flexible standard of
probable cause.20 1
Under current law, there is no federal "tender years" exception.20 2
As a result, federal courts may only admit the out-of-court statements of
a child at trial if they meet the requirements of a "residual" exception.20 3
Federal law, aside from a few perfunctory comments in judicial
opinions,204 has even less to say about whether the hearsay statements of
a child may be used to form the basis for a finding of probable cause.205
A formally adopted federal "tender years" exception, allowing the
use of a child's hearsay statements as a basis for a finding of probable
cause, would eliminate the existing obscurity in this area and provide
more certainty than an ambiguously defined "residual" exception.206
This exception would also promote the same policy rationales as a
similar exception for evidence admitted at trial: (1) ensuring that an
investigation does not cease due to the child's unwillingness or inability
to participate as a result of trauma or other extenuating circumstances;
207
and (2) guaranteeing that reliable evidence is not discarded because of
208overly harsh procedural requirements.
Needless to say, a federal court evaluating the sufficiency of a
finding of probable cause may not use a "tender years" exception as a
carte blanche for upholding a warrant based solely on unreliable hearsay
199. See, e.g., MICH. CT. RULE § 3.972(C)(2) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-221
(2007).
200. See In re Archer, 744 N.W.2d 1, 8-9 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (admitting child's
hearsay testimony at trial under "tender years" exception).
201. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
202. See Marks, supra note 15, at 234.
203. See id. at 234-35; see also FED. R. EVID. 807. Federal Rule of Evidence 807
allows hearsay evidence to be admitted under the "residual" exception if:
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence the proponent can obtain
through reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice.
Id.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 624 (6th Cir. 2006).
205. See id.
206. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
207. See Marks, supra note 15, at 213.
208. See id.
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testimony.209 The trustworthiness of a child's statements should still be
satisfactorily evaluated by looking at factors such as "spontaneity,
consistent repetition, the mental state of the declarant, use of terminology
unexpected of a child of a similar age, and lack of motive to fabricate."'2 10
A federal "tender years" hearsay exception in this context would
eliminate the prospect of "the exclusion of many trustworthy, probative
statements. Far from achieving justice, a rule [that prohibits child
hearsay] would hinder the state's ability to protect its citizens from
sexual abuse and other criminal conduct.",211 Implementing such an
exception would ensure that reliable evidence is not written off as useless
during the pre-trial stages of an investigation.
C. Concise Recommendation
The previous section outlined the elements of proposed legislation
that would clarify and unify existing law into an across-the-board federal
standard regarding the sufficiency of child testimony, including the
testimony of children with developmental disabilities, to establish
probable cause for a search or arrest warrant. 12 This statute would have
three major elements: (1) a flexible factor test, used to determine the
reliability and sufficiency of the child's testimony; (2) a corroboration
exception; and (3) a hearsay exception. 13
The first element, a factor test, consists of six factors courts can use
to evaluate whether a child's testimony is sufficient to establish probable
cause. 214 The author intends the test to be flexible, such that no one
factor is dispositive or fatal to a finding of probable cause, as the U.S.
Supreme Court has routinely stated that probable cause is a fluid, non-
technical standard. 2 5 These six factors are: (1) the child's age;216 (2) the
child's ability to accurately identify his or her abuser;217 (3) the presence
or absence of corroborating evidence; 218 (4) the length of time between
209. See id. at 208-09 (discussing pressure on politicians and courts to "get tough on
crime," specifically child sexual abuse, as well as the "frightening prospect" of false
accusations and prosecutions for such crimes). Marks argues that, despite the
emotionally charged nature of child sexual abuse cases, legislation must balance the
desire to achieve justice for victims against the need to protect the rights of criminal
defendants. Id.
210. In re Archer, 744 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
211. Marks, supra note 15, at 226.
212. See supra Part III.B.
213. See supra Parts III.B.1-3.
214. See supra Part III.B.1.
215. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,230-31 (1983).
216. See supra Part III.B. .a.
217. See supra Part III.B.l.b.
218. See supra Part III.B.l.e.
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the alleged abuse and the testimony; 219 (5) the spontaneity of the child's
statements; 220 and (6) the experiential nature of the statements.
221
The second element, a corroboration exception modeled after
similar state provisions,222 emphasizes that a child's testimony need not
be corroborated to support a finding of probable cause, so long as other
factors render the testimony sufficiently reliable.223
The third and final element, a "tender years" hearsay exception,
likewise inspired by similar state statutes, 224 permits a court to uphold a
finding of probable cause based on the out-of-court hearsay statements of
a child.225 Like the corroboration exception, the hearsay exception may
apply only if the hearsay statements forming the basis for probable cause
are sufficiently reliable.226
IV. CONCLUSION
When it comes to the testimony of children, including those with
developmental disabilities, federal law thus far has predominately
concerned itself with the admissibility of such testimony during full-
scale criminal trials. 227 While it is undoubtedly important to craft
protections for children who testify in open court, federal law in its
current state ignores the reality that much of the child testimony upon
which the legal system relies takes place outside of court during the pre-
trial stages of criminal investigations. 8 Specifically, in cases involving
crimes against children, in which the victim is often the only witness,
police officers, magistrates, and judges regularly use child testimony to
establish probable cause for search and arrest warrants. 9
Currently, only a mishmash of federal caselaw addresses the use of
such pre-trial testimony, and applicable standards vary among circuits.230
Further, neither the federal court system nor Congress has adopted a
clear standard for evaluating the reliability of the testimony of children
219. See supra Part III.B. 1.d.
220. See supra Part III.B. .e.
221. See supra Part III.B.L.f.
222. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Part III.B.2.
224. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
225. See supra Part III.B.3.
226. See Marks, supra note 15, at 241 ("[T]he tender years statute must admit only
statements with 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' or 'sufficient indicia of
reliability."').
227. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006 & Supp. 2009); see also supra Part II.C.2
(explaining the scope of Section 3509).
228. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Parts II.D.1-3.
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with developmental disabilities. 231 This lack of clarity may present
increasing difficulty in the coming years, especially given the rising
number of children diagnosed with developmental disabilities, such as
autism spectrum disorders
232 and ADHD. 233
Accordingly, to ensure justice for particularly vulnerable victims,
Congress should enact federal legislation in this area. Such a statute
would create a workable standard that achieves the goals of clarity,
predictability, and consistency across the entire federal system. At the
same time, any standard must maintain the level of flexibility necessary
to meet the unique needs of child victims and witnesses, including those
with developmental disabilities.
As noted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime:
In criminal justice systems, victims of crime are often forgotten. A
fair, effective and humane criminal justice system is one that respects
the fundamental rights of suspects and offenders, as well as those of
victims, and that is based on the principle that victims should be
adequately recognized and treated with respect for their dignity.
Those categories of victim, including children, who are particularly
vulnerable, either through their personal characteristics or through the
circumstances of the crime, should benefit from measures tailored to
their situation.
234
The goal of properly serving the needs of these victims during the pre-
trial stages of an investigation is certainly lofty, but it is not beyond
Congress's reach. If such protections are not granted, the justice system
may unwittingly insulate a class of victims from the protection of federal
law. Justice is not served by discounting the testimony of the most
vulnerable victims merely due to youth or disability.
23
231. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
232. See Benedict Carey, Diagnoses of Autism on the Rise, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2012, http://nyti.ms/Hllole ("The likelihood of a child's being given a diagnosis
of autism, Asperger syndrome or a related disorder increased by more than 20 percent
from 2006 to 2008[.]").
233. See Michelle Castillo, ADHD Diagnosis Rates Up 24 Percent over Decade, CBS
NEWS, Jan. 22, 2013, http://cbsn.ws/l0pyN7f ("The number of children diagnosed with
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) skyrocketed 24 percent between 2001
and 2010[.]").
234. CYRIL LAUCCI, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK FOR
PROFESSIONALS AND POLICYMAKERS ON JUSTICE IN MATTERS INVOLVING CHILD VICTIMS
AND WITNESSES OF CRIME 1 (2009), available at http://bit.ly/YZYqQO.
235. See id.
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